A key premise of the kalam cosmological argument is that the universe began to exist. However, while a number of philosophers have offered powerful criticisms of William Lane Craig's defense of the premise, J.P. Moreland has also offered a number of unique arguments in support of it, and to date, little attention has been paid to these in the literature. In this paper, I attempt to go some way toward redressing this matter. In particular, I shall argue that Moreland's philosophical arguments against the possibility of traversing a beginningless past are unsuccessful.
look no further than (4) . The consequent of (4) has two conjuncts, and it will help to evaluate the premise if we split it in two: 4a. If all the members of S have been actualized, then S is constituted by a specifiable, determinate number of events.
4b. If all the members of S have been actualized, then S has a first member.
Start with (4a). To evaluate it, we'll need to know what Moreland means by a "specifiable, determinate number of events". A natural interpretation of the language suggests that it denotes a number of events that can be specified by some natural number n, 8 i.e., a finite number of events. But if so, then (4a) asserts that the actualization of the causal sequence responsible for the present moment requires that the sequence is finite.
But since that's the very point in dispute, Moreland can't just assert without argument that (4a) is true without begging the question against those antecedently unconvinced of the conclusion.
However, while Moreland doesn't explicitly offer an argument for (4a), he does offer a reason in support of (4b), and that rationale can be used to support (4a) as well.
Now recall that (4b) asserts that the actuality of the present moment requires that its causal chain has a first member. But why think that? Recall Moreland's reason from the passage above: "Without a first member, there could be no second, third, or nth member in the chain where the nth member is the present event."
We can thus express Moreland's reasoning here as follows:
1. If a casual sequence S that comprises the universe's history lacks a first member, then S lacks a second, third, etc. member. 2. If S lacks a second, third, etc. member, then S lacks the present event.
3. S contains the present event. 4 . Therefore S has a first member. 9 The argument is clearly valid, and (1) and (3) 
Moreland's Second Argument
Moreland states his second argument against beginningless traversals as follows:
It is impossible to count to infinity. For if one counts forever and ever, he will still be, at every moment, in a place where he can always specify the number he is currently counting. Furthermore, he can always add one more member to what he has counted and thereby increase the series by one. A series formed by successive addition is a potential infinite. Such a series can increase forever without limit, but it will always be finite. This means that the past must have been finite. For the present moment is the last member of the series of past events formed by successive addition. And since one cannot reach infinity one at a time, then if the past was actually infinite, the present moment could not have been reached. For to come to the present moment, an actual infinite would have to have been crossed. 10 We can express the argument a bit more formally as follows:
1. At every point in the growth of any potential infinite, one can specify its cardinal number via a natural number and increase that number by 1.
2. If at every point in the growth of any potential infinite, one can specify its cardinal number via a natural number and increase that number by 1, then no actual infinite can be formed from a potential infinite by successive addition. 3. Therefore, no actual infinite can be formed from a potential infinite by successive addition. (From 1 and 2) 4. Any series formed by successive addition is (at least initially) a potential infinite. 5. The past is a series formed by successive addition. 6. Therefore, the past is (at least initially) a potential infinite. (From 4 and 5) 7. Therefore, the past cannot be an actual infinite formed from a potential infinite by successive addition. (From 3 and 6)
The argument is valid, and (3), (6) and (7) follow from other premises. Furthermore, (1), (2) and (5) Perhaps, though, Moreland construes a beginningless past in the way he does in an attempt to be charitable. For one might worry that if, in a beginningless past, some infinite set or other is traversed before every event, then such a past has at least one infinite proper subset of events that wasn't formed by successive addition, which seems absurd.
I don't know if this is why Moreland construes a beginningless past in the way he
does, but such a worry is ill-founded. For such reasoning relies on an inference involving an illicit quantifier shift, reasoning from 1. Every point in a beginningless past is such that there exists an actually infinite set of events that existed prior to it. to 2. There is an actually infinite set of events, such that it exists prior to every point in a beginningless past.
Such is the same illicit pattern of inference involved in reasoning that if every child has a mother who directly gave birth to them, then there is a mother who directly gave birth to every such child.
No, if the past is beginningless, then while an infinite subset of events exists prior to each event, it's a new infinite every time. To illustrate: pick any event --say, the present day --and represent it by the integer -1. Then the set of past days traversed for each of the previous days, and including today, can be represented as follows:
. Thus, if a past of this sort is possible, then as is represented above, the set of days traversed at each day of the past is actually infinite. However, at each day, the set of days traversed is different. So, for example, the set of days traversed today contains, in addition to the set of days traversed yesterday, the new member represented by -1, viz., today. Thus, if the past is beginningless, then while the set of events traversed at each point in the past is actually infinite, it's a new set every time, as each passing event adds a new member to the previous set. Therefore, from the fact that a beginningless past doesn't involve the formation of an infinite set of events from a finite set of events, it doesn't follow that such a past includes a subset of events that wasn't formed by successive addition.
Moreland's Third Argument
Now let's consider the third and final unique 11 argument Moreland offers for the impossibility of a beginningless traversal:
...Suppose a person were to think backward through the series of events in the past...Now he will either come to a beginning or he will not. If he comes to a beginning, then the universe obviously had a beginning. But if he never could, even in principle, reach a first moment, then this means that it would be impossible to start with the present and run backward through all the events in the history of the cosmos...But since events really move in the other direction, this is equivalent to admitting that if there was no beginning, the past could have never been exhaustively traversed to reach the present. Counting to infinity through the series 1, 2, 3, ... involves the same number of steps as does counting down from infinity to zero through the series …, -5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0. In fact this second series may be even more difficult to traverse than the first. Apart from the fact that both series have the same number of members to be traversed, the second series cannot even get started. This is because it has no first member!
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Stripped down to its essentials, we can express the core of the argument as follows:
1. If the past is beginningless, then it's impossible in principle to traverse from the present all the way through the past.
2. If it's impossible in principle to traverse something in one direction, then it's impossible in principle to traverse it in the other direction. 3. Therefore, if the past is beginningless, then it's impossible in principle to traverse the past all the way to the present. (From 1 and 2) 4. But it's not impossible in principle to traverse the past all the way to the present (as demonstrated by the actuality of the present). 5. Therefore, the past is not beginningless. (From 3 and 4) This argument is valid. Furthermore, (3) follows from (1) and (2), and (1) and (4) have at least prima facie plausibility. That leaves us with (2) . Why are we supposed to accept it?
One might think that (2) has a lot going for it, since it seems that all finite sequences are such that if one direction can be traversed in principle (at least mentally --leave aside worries about actual traversals into the past), then so can the other direction.
However, one might worry that although this may be so for all finite temporal sequences, it's not obviously so for infinite temporal sequences. Perhaps, then, those not antecedently convinced will need a little more help before they can confidently accept (2).
Thankfully, Moreland doesn't leave us guessing as to his own basis for accepting (2) in the passage above. For recall that he argued there that admitting the impossibility of starting with the present and exhaustively traversing the past "is equivalent to admitting that if there was no beginning, the past could have never been exhaustively traversed to reach the present", on the grounds that "Counting to infinity through the believe that no infinite spatial or temporal distance is crossable on the grounds that one cannot reach the end of that which has no end. This seems clearly true. Still, while this difficulty arises for the case of starting at the present and traversing through a beginningless past, it does not arise in the case of a traversal from a beginningless past to the present. For unlike the former, the latter has an endpoint, viz., the present moment.
Therefore, while both traversals involve the same number of steps, one has a difficulty that the other lacks. Here, then, is one asymmetry in difficulty of traversal for actual infinites that casts doubt on Moreland's rationale for (2).
(ii) Going forward, you don't have to begin at some point; not so going backward. One might think that no infinite is traversable on the basis of Moreland's argument, discussed previously, that if one begins an infinite count from 0 or 1 to infinity, then one will at every point be counting a finite number n. Suppose we grant this. Still, while this difficulty applies to the case of starting at the present and traversing through a beginningless past, it does not apply to the case of a traversal from a beginningless past to the present moment. For unlike the former, the latter has no starting point. Therefore, while both traversals involve the same number of steps, one has a difficulty that the other lacks. We therefore have another asymmetry in difficulty of traversal for actual infinites that casts doubt on Moreland's rationale for (2) .
(iii) Going forward, some infinite traversal or other is completed at each point; not so going backward. One might think that no infinite is crossable on the basis of Moreland's argument, discussed previously, that if one tries to count to infinity by beginning at some point --say, with the number 1 or 0 --then one will never get over the hurdle of going from having counted a finite set to having counted an infinite set. Again, grant that this is true. The problem is that while this difficulty applies to the task of starting with the present moment and mentally traversing all the events of a beginningless past, it doesn't apply to the task of never starting --but always counting --from a beginningless past and then stopping with the present moment. For unlike the former task, there is no such hurdle in the latter task. For before every point in a beginningless past, some infinite set of events or other has already been traversed --one is always on the other side of the hurdle, so to speak. Therefore, while both traversals involve the same number of steps, one has a difficulty that the other lacks. We therefore have yet another asymmetry in difficulty of traversal for actual infinites that casts doubt on Moreland's rationale for (2) .
Prima facie, then, there is reason to doubt that Moreland is right about his rationale for (2): given the asymmetries mentioned above, it appears that Moreland owes us an explanation as to why they have no bearing on ease or difficulty of traversing a beginningless past. Pending such an explanation, Moreland's rationale for (2) is undercut.
And pending another basis for (2), then, Moreland's third unique 11 argument against beginningless traversals is likewise defeated. This is not quite the end of the matter, however. For as we saw in the passage above, Moreland thinks there is an asymmetry in direction of traversal that results in a different sort of asymmetry in difficulty of traversal. But unlike the three discussed above, Moreland thinks this asymmetry makes a traversal from past to present more difficult than a traversal from present to past. As Moreland puts it in the passage above:
"In fact this second series [i.e., counting down the negative integers and ending at 0] may be even more difficult to traverse than the first [i.e., starting with 0 or 1 and then counting through all the natural numbers]. Apart from the fact that both series have the same number of members to be traversed, the second series cannot even get started. This is because it has no first member!"
Our discussion of Moreland's first two arguments provides the basis for a reply to his reasoning above. First, we saw in our discussion of Moreland's first argument that while it's true that a beginningless traversal could never "get started", those who are antecedently open to the possibility of beginningless traversals are not committed to the claim that it could. Rather, by the very nature of the case, a beginningless series has no beginning point from which it "got started". For if such a past is possible --which is the very issue under dispute --then it has always been going, in the sense that for every event, there is another event that preceded it. Furthermore, while Moreland has offered arguments for the necessity of a start or beginning for all traversals, we saw that these arguments are question-begging.
Second, we saw in our discussion of Moreland's second argument that while it may be true that in traversing such a series one never gets to a point where a "first"
infinite is traversed, this is only because some infinite temporal segment or other is already crossed at every point in a beginningless past. We also saw that one is guilty of an illicit quantifier shift if from this one reasons that such a past would absurdly contain an infinite segment that was not formed by successive addition. Thus, Moreland's additional remarks in the passage above add nothing to his case against beginningless traversals.
Conclusion
I have argued that Moreland's unique arguments against beginningless traversals depend upon one or more of the following dubious assumptions: that all traversals require a start or a first member; that any series formed by successive addition is (at least initially) a potential infinite; that traversing a beginningless past must involve the transformation of a potential infinite into an actual infinite; and that it's just as easy or hard to traverse a sequence in one direction as it is to traverse it in the other. For this reason, the proponent of the kalam cosmological argument will have to look elsewhere for support of the premise that the universe began to exist.
...Consider a runner who begins at some point A and who wishes to reach the midpoint between A and B. But before he can reach this midpoint, he must reach the midpoint of the midpoint. In order to move from any point to any other point, a runner must traverse an infinite number of points and this is impossible. Thus, [concludes Zeno] motion is an illusion. (p. 30)
Moreland then argues that a structurally identical paradox applies to the hypothesis of a beginningless universe: if the past were beginningless, then the prospects of traversing all the events of the past to reach the present moment would be like those of Zeno's runner on the assumption that his task involved the traversal of an actual infinite: one couldn't even begin such a task, much less finish it. Moreland thus thinks Zeno's Dichotomy paradox and his paradox for a beginningless past are structurally similar. His next step is to argue for a solution to the former, and then to reason that, by analogy, the solution to the latter is similar. Thus, he argues that the most plausible way to solve Zeno's Dichotomy paradox is to distinguish between an actual and a potential infinite, and to assert that the racer's task only involves the traversal of a potential infinite. And since all spatial distances that are merely potentially infinite are traversable in principle, the racer can traverse the whole track. (ibid.) Similarly, the set of temporal distances in the universe's past is potentially infinite only, and thus finite. I find Moreland's argument unpersuasive, as it's not clear that the two paradoxes are sufficiently relevantly similar to conclude that their solutions are similar. As Morriston points out (ibid.), the runner's task has a beginning or starting point; not so for a beginningless past. And the worry is that this feature, which generates the problem in Zeno's Dichotomy paradox, doesn't necessarily apply to a beginningless past. In other words, if the requirement of a start is merely a feature of Zeno's thought experiment, and not an essential property of beginningless traversals in general, then the stated grounds for thinking Zeno's runner's task is impossible do not provide adequate grounds for thinking that traversing a beginningless past is impossible. Now of course one might reply that it is an essential property of all traversals that they have a starting point. But the problem is that that's the very issue in dispute. For it's part of the very concept of a beginningless past that it involves traversing an infinite without a starting point. Therefore, whether or not such traversals are impossible, one cannot just assert the impossibility of a traversal that lacks a starting point without begging the question against the antecedently unconvinced. 12. Ibid., pp. 201-202.
